

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05

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S E C R E T RABAT 1450

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS

SUBJECT: CHANGES IN FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

REF: STATE 51768

1. GENERAL: BEFORE ANSWERING THE SPECIFICS OF REFTTEL, PARA 5, AN OVERVIEW IS IN ORDER TO PLACE THE SPECIFICS IN PERSPECTIVE.

DURING THE LATE 60'S AND UNTIL THE COUP ATTEMPTS OF 1971 AND 72, US-MOROCCAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WERE GENERALLY GOOD. AFTER THE SECOND COUP ATTEMPT, HOWEVER, IN WHICH US-TRAINED PILOTS ATTEMPTED TO SHOOT DOWN THE KING'S PLANE, A DISTRUST OF PERSONNEL TRAINED IN CONUS DEVELOPED. CONTACT BETWEEN GOM MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MUSLO PERSONNEL BECAME VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT, EXCEPT FOR MINIMUM NECESSARY BUSINESS. AFTER THE OCTOBER 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR THE KING AGAIN TURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO MODERNIZE HIS ARMED FORCES AND TO HELP REPLACE EQUIPMENT LEFT IN SYRIA AND EGYPT. EITHER THROUGH FMS OR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, GOM HAS ORDERED U.S. EQUIPMENT TO MODERNIZE TWO MECHANIZED BRIGADES. GOM HAS ALSO ORDERED ADDITIONAL VEHICLES AND OTHER ITEMS IN EXCESS OF THE TWO-BRIGADE REQUIREMENT. THIS PROGRAM ALREADZITOTALS MORE THAN

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\$500 MILLION AND CONTINUES TO GROW MODESTLY, PRIMARILY THROUGH

COMMERCIAL ACQUISITIONS.

2. WITH THE ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WELL UNDER WAY, GOM IS INCREASING EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE AIR FORCE: T-34C'S REPLACING T-6'S, C-130H'S REPLACING C-119'S, T-2'S, REPLACING FOUGAS FOR TRAINING, MIRAGES REPLACING FIGHTER FOUGAS, AN ADDITIONAL SQUADRON OF F-5E/F'S AND AN ADDITIONAL SQUADRON OF COBRA HELICOPTERS. COST OF THE U.S. AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT PORTION OF THIS PROJECTED AIR FORCE PROGRAM NOW EXCEEDS \$300 MILLION.

3. THE MOROCCAN NAVY IS ALSO BEGINNING TO STEP UP ITS MODERNIZATION EFFORTS, AND MUSLO HAS BEEN APPROACHED FOR COST INFORMATION ON SHIPS, MARINE EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING.

4. ALTHOUGH DOLLAR TOTALS APPEAR HIGH AT FIRST GLANCE, THE PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE DOES NOT SEEM GRANDIOSE, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE INCREASED DEFENSE NEEDS RESULTING FROM THE RECENT ACQUISITION OF A PORTION OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA. IN SUM, U.S. BUSINESS HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPETED FOR MORE THAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS OF NEW SALES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ANNUAL COST OF GRANT AID TRAINING HAS BEEN LESS THAN ONE MILLION DOLLARS, PLUS THE COST OF MUSLO OPERATION. THIS TRAINING HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN REOPENING THE DOORS WITH THE GOM MILITARY IN THE PAST TWO YEARS AND IN STARTING GOM DOWN THE RIGHT TRACK TOWARDS OBTAINING NEEDED TRAINING. IN OVERCOMING FEELING IN THE MOROCCAN MILITARY AGAINST SENDING TRAINEES TO CONUS, FACT THAT TRAINING WAS FREE HAS BEEN HELPFUL FACTOR. FROM POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT APPRECIATED BY GOM AS A POSITIVE INDICATION OF U.S. INTEREST IN MOROCCO.

5. MISSION DOES NOT QUARREL WITH CONCEPT OF FULL PRICING OF GRANT AID/FMS TRAINING, BUT WE THINK LEVELS OF SUCH TRAINING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BASIS TO ENSURE COMPATIBILITY WITH OUT POLICY FOR EACH COUNTRY AND ITS AREA. WITH MAP TERMINATION PROJECTED AT THE END OF FY 77, THIS MIGHT BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO JUSTIFY INCREASES IN GRANT AID TRAINING COMPATIBLE WITH FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS.

6. FOLLOWING ARE OUR RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED IN PARA 5 OF REFTEL, FOLLOWING SAME SUBPARAGRAPH LETTERING:

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A. GOM HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THE TOTAL COST OF GRANT AID TRAINING PROVIDED EACH YEAR, BUT HAS NOTICED A DECREASE IN AVAILABLE TRAINING, WHICH WE HAVE EXPLAINED AS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INFLATION. A DRAMATIC DECREASE IN FREE TRAINING WE PROVIDE COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. PARTICULARLY ON THE HEELS OF A SERIES OF RECENT U.S. DENIALS OF MOROCCAN ASSISTANCE REQUESTS, SUCH A DECREASE MIGHT

WELL BE INTERPRETED BY GOM AS A SIGN OF LESSENING USG INTEREST IN MOROCCO AND DECREASING RESPONSIVENESS TO MOROCCAN MILITARY NEEDS. AT THIS JUNCTURE, A DOUBLING OF FREE TRAINING WOULD DO MUCH TO COUNTERACT THE ABOVE ADVERSE SENTIMENTS.

B. GOM DESIRES TO ACCOMPLISH AS MUCH OF THE REQUIRED TRAINING IN COUNTRY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, MOROCCANS REALIZE THAT SOME HIGHLY SPECIALIZED TRAINING IS BEST PROVIDED IN CONUS. UNFORTUNATELY, UNDER THE ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, TRAINING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE LETTERS OF OFFER FOR BASIC EQUIPMENT. THIS REQUIRES OFFERING AS MUCH SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN CONUS AS POSSIBLE UNDER GRANT AID. THIS WOULD INCLUDE TRAINING FOR INSTRUCTOR, OPERATOR AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL FOR TOW, DRAGON, CHAPARRAL, AND VULCAN, AS A MINIMUM. MTT'S REQUIRED FOR THE ARMY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WILL HAVE TO BE PURCHASED BY GOM UNDER FMS PROCEDURES. AS FOR AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION, GOM IS IN CONSIDERABLY BETTER SHAPE SINCE MUCH OF THE REQUIRED TRAINING IS OFFERED IN THE BASIC LETTER OF OFFER OR COMMERCIAL CONTRACT. OTHER TRAINING FOR THE AIR FORCE, NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR DURING EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION, WILL HAVE TO BE PURCHASED UNDER FMS. REQUESTS FOR TRAINING OF THE MOROCCAN NAVY ARE ON THE INCREASE, BUT THE NAVY'S COMMANDER HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PURCHASE THE TRAINING UNDER FMS.

C. TRAINING COURSES TAUGHT IN ENGLISH PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT TO OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO, WITH THOSE GIVEN IN CONUS BEING OF GREATEST VALUE. TRAINING ON THE MORE COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO AVOID FUTURE BAD RELATIONS SHOULD MOROCCO BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN OR OPERATE SUCH EQUIPMENT PROPERLY. MOST OF THIS TYPE OF TRAINING IS CURRENTLY BEING FUNDED UNDER GRANT AID. IF COSTS DOUBLE, MUCH ESSENTIAL TRAINING WILL NOT BE COVERED UNDER THE PRESENT PROGRAM FUNDING LEVEL. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MOROCCAN AIR FORCE HAS ASKED FOR GRANT  
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AID TRAINING FOR 30 PILOTS TO BE TRAINED FROM INITIAL PILOT TRAINING THROUGH F-5E COMBAT CREW TRAINING. UNDER EXISTING GRANT AID FUNDING LEVELS NOT A SINGLE TRAINING SLOT CAN BE PROVIDED AND IT PSYWJD  
TEW CRLBBRQJ  
S  
YE  
ZOGT  
COVERED BY FMS.

D. IF TRAINING CAN BE PURCHASED WITH THE BASIS LETTER OF OFFER OR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, THIS PROCEDURE WILL BE MUCH EASIER FOR GOM, BEING BUDGETED WITH ACQUISITION FUNDS. HISTORICALLY, GOM OPERATING BUDGETS HAVE BEEN QUITE LOW WHICH MEANS THAT SOME TRAINING FUNDED FROM THIS BUDGET MAY BE ABANDONED OR TAINING

CARRIED OUT IN MOROCCO BY MOROCCANS. THE MOROCCAN AIR FORCE HAS CANCELLED MUCH OF ITS FY 76 GRANT AID TRAINING FOR THE C-130 AND IS STARTING A SCHOOL AT KENITRA FOR THIS PURPOSE.

E. MOROCCO IN PAST HAS OBTAINED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TRAINING FROM FRANCE; IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT SUCH TRAINING WILL INCREASE IN FUTURE. MOROCCO ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SOME NAVAL TRAINEES IN THE SOVIET UNION. INCREASED FRENCH TRAINING IN PARTICULAR COULD CAUSE COMPLICATIONS, BECAUSE IN MANY RESPECTS U.S. AND FRENCH MILITARY SYSTEMS ARE AT ODDS. A CURRENT EXAMPLE IS FRUSTRATION OF MOROCCAN AIR FORCE US-TRAINED LOGISTICIANS WHO ARE TRYING TO WORK WITH THEIR ANTIQUATED FRENCH STYLE LOGISTICS SYSTEM. OF GREATER IMPACT IS FACT THAT GOM INTENDS TO AUTOMATE FULLY ITS LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AND IS ALREADY LEANING TOWARD FRENCH FOR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. IF FRENCH ORCHESTRATE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SYSTEM, GOM INTEREST IN U.S. MILITARY MATERIAL AND DOCTRINE IS LIKELY TO DECLINE. WORKING MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USG COULD ALSO BE EXPECTED TO WORSEN AS CLOSER TIES WITH FRENCH FORMED. WE HAVE BEEN HEARING REMARKS FROM MOROCCAN MILITARY OFFICERS RECENTLY THAT FRANCE IS PERHAPS A MORE RELIABLE FRIEND TO GOM IN TIME OF NEED THAN IS THE U.S. IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT TO US, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT FRANCE HAS LOANED GOM A TACAN, WHICH USG REFUSED TO DO.

F. IF GRANT AID TRAINING FOR MOROCCO WERE ELIMINATED, RESULTS COULD BE HIGHLY ADVERSE. ALTHOUGH GOM COULD PAY FOR TRAINING,  
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ELIMINATION OF GRANT AID TRAINING MIGHT BE VIEWED AS SIGN OF SERIOUSLY DIMINISHING US INTEREST IN MOROCCO AND COULD RAISE QUESTIONS AS TO FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY COOPERATION IN GENERAL. ONE NEGATIVE RESULT MIGHT BE DECREASE IN AVAILABILITY OF MOROCCAN PORTS FOR VISITS BY US NAVY, FOR EXAMPLE, SENIOR GOM OFFICIALS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO POINT INVIDIOUSLY TO "VAST" U.S. AID TO SPAIN, IMPLYING THAT OUR EXISTING NAVAL FACILITIES, NAVAL VISITS AND OTHER BENEFITS TO US AFFORDED BY MOROCCO JUSTIFY SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER US IMPUT HERE THAN IS CURRENTLY THE CASE.  
ANDERSON

NOTE BY OC/T: PARA 6C RABAT 1450 AS RECEIVED.

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